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This paper analyzes the offshoring strategy from an empirical view. It focuses on a set of 
models, extracts a set of testable hypothesises and creates a suitable set of variable to test their 
validity.  This analysis is based on a data set from French manufacturing firms that provides 
detailed information on the offshoring strategy.  The choice of offshoring modes is 
investigated through the estimation of a multinomial logit model and associated to a set of 
explanatory variables at the firm, industry and country levels. Our results emphasize the role 
of firm heterogeneity, input specificity and of market thickness.  
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This paper analyzes the offshoring strategy from an empirical view. A growing theoretical literature 
investigates the international vertical specialization of modern firms and combines elements of the 
organizational theory of the firm (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1985) with elements of the 
theories on international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and firm heterogeneity. We focus on a 
set of models (Antras, 2003; Antras and Helpman, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 2005), extract a set 
of testable hypothesises and create a suitable set of variable to test their validity.  
  
Our analysis is based on a data set from French manufacturing firms that provides detailed information 
on the offshoring strategy. More precisely, each firm reports for each of its import transactions the 
country of origin, the classification of the imported input as well as the mode of organization of the 
transaction. We are, thus, able to define three modes of offshoring, vertical FDI, partnerships and 
outsourcing (transactions with independent suppliers).  
 
The choice between these three modes of organization is investigated through the estimation of a 
multinomial logit model and associated to a set of explanatory variables at the firm, industry and 
country levels. More precisely, at the level of the firm we focus on the impact of heterogeneity, 
represented by productivity and scale. At the industry level, we emphasize the impact of input 
specificity as well as the intensity in headquarter services. At the country level we put forward the role 
of market thickness, the level of search technologies, the quality of the legal system and the cost of 
production.  
 
Our results show that the pattern of firm heterogeneity follows the hierarchy of fixed costs associated 
with each mode of organization. The data suggests that partnerships require the highest fixed cost of 
organization followed by outsourcing and then by vertical FDI. Partnerships as well as outsourcing 
require search and matching costs as well as monitoring and control efforts. Our results show that 
more productive firms and larger ones establish partnerships, relatively low productive and small ones 
vertically integrate and firms with relatively intermediate levels of productivity and scale establish 
outsourcing agreements.  
 
Our results confirm the significant effect of relation specific investment on the organizational choice. In 
industries sensitive to input specificity and intensive in headquarter services, firms prefer to vertically 
integrate in order to minimize transaction costs related to incomplete contracts and hold-up problems.  
At the country level, the results emphasize the impact of market thickness and of search technologies. 
In thicker markets, it is easier to find a suitable partner. Hence, contractual agreements are preferred to 
vertical integration. The quality of the legal system is important for partnerships.  Partnerships 
correspond to long term relationships and complex contractual agreements.  In this sense, partnerships 
are more sensitive to the degree of contract incompleteness.  
 
A natural extension of this work will be to consider theoretical models based on alternative view of the 
firm like the theory of managerial incentives (Grossman and Helpman, 2004) or the theory of real and 





Globalization is changing the patterns of international economy. Foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and international trade are growing faster than world GDP. Through FDI
and trade, national economies are getting more and more linked and interdependent.
The decline of trade barriers and of transportation costs is the most perceptible expla-
nation of the growing internationalization of economies. However, it seems that this
decline explains only a part of the growth of FDI and trade. In fact many observa-
tions, case studies (Feenstra, 1998; Hummels et al., 1998) and empirical analysis (Campa
and Goldberg, 1997; Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Hummels et al., 2001) indicate that the
cause is the changing structure of the economic activity toward vertical specialization.
For example, Feenstra (1998) presents the case of the Barbie doll and of the Nike shoes.
Both products are designed and marketed by the American parent ﬁrms. However the
production process is disintegrated and outsourced to ﬁrms in China, Taiwan, Philip-
pines, South Korea and other Asian countries. Campa and Goldberg (1997) analyze the
external orientation of manufacturing industries for the United States (U.S.), Canada,
Japan and the United Kingdom (U.K.). Combining data on imports with input-output
tables, they show that the use of imported inputs is steadily increasing especially in the
case of the U.S. and the U.K. The increase in international activities and of vertical spe-
cialization has raised several questions and concerns in the academic sphere as well as
in the political and public opinion. The growth of input’s trade has created fears of job
losses and production delocalizing from developed toward developing and low wages
countries.
Thequestionofverticalspecializationhasmainlybeenaddressedtheoretically. Given
the growing extent of the international vertical specialization phenomenon and the im-
plications it may have on economies, several authors (Grossman and Helpman, 2003;
Antras, 2003; Antras and Helpman, 2004) have developed theoretical models to explain
the ﬁrm’s offshoring strategy. The analysis of offshoring needs to explain at the same
1time the organization of production (make or buy) as well as the location of production
(at home or abroad). For this purpose, the combination of theoretical elements from the
international trade literature with elements of the industrial organization literature is
necessary.
From our point view, offshoring corresponds to the delocalization of production to a
different country. This delocalization can either take place within the ﬁrm boundaries,
through vertical FDI, or at arm’s length ,through international outsourcing.
Grossman and Helpman (2003), Grossman and Helpman (2004) Antras (2003), Antras
and Helpman (2004) are examples of this emerging literature. In these models, ﬁnal
good producers face several choices to acquire intermediate inputs. They can produce
the inputs through vertical integration or outsource the production to independent sup-
pliers. Moreover the production of the inputs can take place either at home or abroad (in
low wage countries). The choice of each ﬁrm depends on several trade-offs: difference
between organization costs, difference between production costs and difference in the
contractual environment. This literature puts forward the importance of ﬁrm hetero-
geneity and of sector speciﬁcities (headquarter intensity, capital intensity) in the preva-
lence of one mode of vertical specialization over the others. Although these models
have similar aspects, they differ signiﬁcantly in their conclusions, especially regarding
the sorting pattern of heterogenous ﬁrms and offshoring choices.
As stated by Antras and Helpman (2004): "Empirical evidence is needed to discriminate be-
tween [them] the models" which is the aim of this paper.
Forthetimebeing, theempiricalevidenceonthedeterminantsoftheoffshoringstrategy
is very scarce especially at the ﬁrm level. Antras (2003) presents an empirical analysis
on U.S. intra-ﬁrm imports from 28 countries for 23 manufacturing industries. Intra-ﬁrm
trade data was, ﬁrst aggregated by industry and explained by industry characteristics,
then aggregated by country and explained by country characteristics. The Antras (2003)
analysis shows that intra-ﬁrm trade is prevalent in exporting industries intensive in
capital and research and development (R&D) and with countries relatively abundant in
2capital. Yeaple (2006) reproduces the Antras (2003) analysis for imports by U.S. multi-
nationals from their foreign afﬁliates. The data is aggregated by industry and different
sets of countries. Yeaple (2006) shows that intra-ﬁrm trade increases with the develop-
ing level of the exporting country, that capital intensity is relevant only for imports from
low developed and emerging countries, and that R&D intensity is relevant especially in
the case of developed countries. Marin (2006) presents the case of offshoring by Aus-
trian and German ﬁrms to East-European countries. The distinction between vertical
integration and arm’s length transaction is based on the share of the parent company in
the capital of the foreign afﬁliate. Marin (2006) shows that intra-ﬁrm imports by Ger-
man parent companies expands with proximity and by the R&D intensity of the activity
of the parent company and decreases with its capital intensity and with the wage level
of the exporting country. Conversely, intra-ﬁrm trade by Austrian parent companies
increases with the capital intensity of the activity of the parent and decreases with its
R&D intensity.
The aim of the paper is to bring evidence on the determinants of the offshoring strat-
egy. More precisely, our empirical analysis is based on the conclusions of the theoretical
literature on this subject. We have selected a certain number of hypotheses and have
constructed appropriate measures in order to investigate empirically their validity. We
particularly focus on the relation between ﬁrm heterogeneity and the ﬁxed costs related
to each form of organization, on industry characteristics like the intensity in headquar-
ter services, and on inputs speciﬁcity. We have also emphasized the role of market
thickness and of the contractual environment of the exporting country.
The empirical analysis presented here is based on the "International Intra-group ex-
changes" survey realized by the French ministry of economy for the year 1999. This
survey covers all international trade transactions by a sample of 4305 ﬁrms located in
France. Although the number of ﬁrms present in the sample is relatively small, the
survey covers, on average, 55% of the French imports and 61% of the French exports.
3The "International Intra-group exchanges" survey provides very rich information on the
structure of French trade and allows us to analyze the offshoring strategy by combining
ﬁrm level, industry level and country level characteristics.
We deﬁne three modes of organization, vertical integration, partnerships and arm’s
length transactions. We investigate how the ﬁrm, industry and country characteris-
tics affects the relative prevalence of these modes of organization. We take the analysis
a step further by aggregating the data by country and industry to verify how the extent
of ﬁrm heterogeneity 1, the headquarter services and capital intensities of industries,
and the capital endowment of countries affect the relative share of each form of off-
shoring.
Our analysis shows that partnerships are associated with the highest level of ﬁxed
costs followed by arm’s length relations while vertical integration is the cheapest in
terms of ﬁxed costs. Interestingly, the sorting pattern of ﬁrms regarding their offshoring
strategy follows the hierarchy of ﬁxed costs. More productive ﬁrms, as well as larger
ones, import inputs from their partners, ﬁrms with intermediates level of productivity
and scale import from independent suppliers and least productive ﬁrms vertically inte-
grate. Moreover, the dispersion of productivity enlarges the share of trade with partners
and reduces intra-ﬁrm trade. The analysis also shows that, as predicted by the property
right theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart, 1986), intensity in headquarter services
and input speciﬁcity favor vertical integration. On the country level, the results show
that market thickness enhances arm’s length transactions while the quality of the con-
tractual environment is signiﬁcant for the establishment of partnerships with foreign
ﬁrms.
The organization of the paper is as follows; The next section discusses the literature
on offshoring and speciﬁes the theoretical hypotheses that we will test. The third section
1The extent of ﬁrm heterogeneity is represented by the dispersion of the productivity distri-
bution in each industry.
4presents the data. the fourth section presents the empirical investigation (methodology
and results). Conclusions are presented in the ﬁfth section.
2 Vertical FDI vs International Outsourcing: A Theoreti-
cal Framework for Offshoring
Vertical specialization gives ﬁrms several possibility to acquire inputs. They can use lo-
cal or imported inputs produced within their boundaries or outsourced to independent
suppliers. The analysis of vertical specialization needs, thus, to take account of the two
dimensions characterizing this strategic choice; the geographical dimension (domes-
tic vs imported inputs) and the organizational one (integration vs outsourcing). The
traditional literature on the ﬁrm’s boundaries (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart,
1986) and that on internationalization (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Markusen, 1984)
analyze, each, one dimension of the vertical specialization strategy and are thus not suf-
ﬁcient to create an appropriate theoretical framework for offshoring.
The growth of vertical trade and of vertical FDI has motivated recent theoretical con-
tributions on internationalization based on the theory of the Firm. These contributions
can mainly be connected to three theories of the ﬁrm: the incomplete contracts and the
property rights theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990),
the theory of the ﬁrm as an incentive system (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994) and the
theory of formal and real authority in organization (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). In this
paper we will focus mainly on theoretical papers related to incomplete contracts, hold-
up problems and the property rights theory of the ﬁrm since these theories are the most
widely used to analyze ﬁrms’organization choices.
Real word transactions are characterized by the incompleteness of contracts. Con-
5tracts are incomplete when they can not specify all contingencies related to a trans-
action. Contract incompleteness is mainly due to bounded rationality, leading to un-
foreseen contingencies, as well as to the cost of writing and enforcing contracts. Being
unable to determine ex-ante all the contingencies, parties engaged in a relationships
needs to renegotiate ex-post, after the production has took place and the production
costs have been incurred,to set the price of the transaction and to bargain over the rents
it generates. Ex-post renegotiation and bargaining are problematic when a transaction
implicates a relation speciﬁc investment (RSI) by one or the two parties. RSI implies
that the input is tailored to the speciﬁc needs of the parties engaged in the relationship
and that it has no, or a very weak, value for an outside party. Parties with a limited out-
side option and thus a weak bargaining power fear to be "held-up" and not to receive
the full marginal returns on their investment. Foreseeing this outcome, they will realize
sub-optimal levels of RSI.
The property rights theory of the ﬁrm, elaborated by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995), emphasizes that the optimal allocation of ownership
rights needs to depend on the parties RSI. In the context of this theory, contract incom-
pleteness and hold up problems are not speciﬁc to outsourcing. Transactions within
integrated ﬁrms are also subject to incomplete contracts. However ownership rights in-
crease ex-post bargaining power and thus reduce ex-ante underinvestment. The alloca-
tion of ownership rights to the party realizing the most valuable RSI for the transaction
will lead to the optimal outcome by reducing the severity of underinvestment by this
party. In other words, when the input is intensive in the ﬁnal good producer’s services
vertical integration is more optimal than outsourcing. Conversely, when the input is
intensive in the supplier’s services outsourcing is preferred.
The property rights and incomplete contracts theory constitutes the framework used
by models like the ones of Feenstra and Hanson (2005), Grossman and Helpman (2003,
2005), Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) to analyze the internationalization
strategy.
6Antras (2003) introduces incomplete contracts and ownership rights into the general
equilibrium models of trade in the aim of offering a new view of the trade theory based
on differences in factor intensities and factor endowments. He considers a ﬁnal good
producer requiring a specialized input from its supplier. Inputs are produced using
the combination of two factors; capital and labor. Because of contracts incompleteness,
RSI in capital and labor are non-contractible ex-ante. Antras (2003) extends the Gross-
man and Hart (1986) framework and considers that investment decisions in capital are
transferable between parties. Labor investment decisions are harder to transfer. Local
suppliers may have a better knowledge of the labor market, moreover managing work-
ers may require a physical presence in the plant.
When the bargaining power of the supplier is weak, the allocation of the residual rights
of control may not sufﬁciently incite the supplier to realize optimal levels of investment.
In this case, the ﬁnal good producer improves its proﬁt by baring the capital investment
costs of its supplier and thus reducing the severity of the hold-up problem faced by the
supplier. In the case of capital intensive inputs, investment in capital is more relevant to
the transaction than investment in labor. According to the property rights theory, own-
ership rights must be allocated to the party realizing capital investment. In the presence
of capital cost sharing (when the ﬁnal good producer bares the costs of capital invest-
ment) vertical integration is optimal. In the case of labor intensive sectors and since
labor investment is always realized by the supplier, ownership must be allocated to the
supplier, thus giving rise to outsourcing agreements.
On the international level, countries differ in their factor endowments while input’s fac-
tor intensity are similar across countries. Production factors as well as ﬁnal good are
immobile internationally, only inputs are traded between countries. Under factor price
equalization, the demand for each factor, in each country, will depend on the number
of varieties produced in that country. Capital (labor) abundant countries will produce
a share of the world production of capital (labor) intensive input varieties larger than
7their share in world income. Trade of capital intensive inputs is realized within the
boundaries of the ﬁrm while trade of labor intensive varieties is realized at arm’s length.
Antras (2003) shows that, for any pair of countries, the volume of intra-ﬁrm imports, as
well as the share of intra-ﬁrm imports in total imports, of a country increases with the
capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.
From the Antras (2003) model we can drive two testable hypotheses:
- Vertical Integration prevails in capital intensive input industries.
-The share of Intra-Firm imports in total trade increases with the capital intensity of
the exporting industry and with the capital abundance of the exporting country.
A major extension of the transaction costs and property rights theories was offered
by papers like the ones of McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002). These
models allows for the interdependence among ﬁrms’ choices and endogenize the ﬁrm’s
ownership decision. An important determinant of the ownership decision at equilib-
rium, in these models, is the thickness of the market.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) consider the choice between vertical integration and
outsourcing at the domestic level. There are three types of ﬁrms on the market, verti-
cally integrated ﬁrms, specialized ﬁnal good producers and specialized input suppliers.
Outsourcing implies ﬁxed cost of search. Before establishing a transaction, specialized
ﬁrms need to search and ﬁnd a suitable partner depending on the technological compat-
ibility. The ﬁrm’s choice depends on the traditional trade-off between the inefﬁciency,
related to vertical integration, and transaction costs and search frictions, associated with
outsourcing. The interaction between ﬁrms is twofold. The proﬁt of a specialized ﬁrm
increases with the number of specialized ﬁrms of the other type and decreases with the
number of specialized ﬁrms of the same type. A rise in the number of specialized sup-
plier will increase the probability of a match and reduces the search costs for a special-
ized ﬁnal good producer raising thus its proﬁt. However, an increase of the number of
specialized ﬁnal good producers will reduces the probability of a match and the proﬁts
8of each one of them. At equilibrium, the ownership decision will depend on the thick-
ness of the market, the elasticity of substitution and the distribution of the bargaining
power.
Grossman and Helpman (2005) consider the choice between domestic and interna-
tional outsourcing. The contribution of this model is the endogenization of the location
decision in equilibrium. However it does not treat the ownership decision, vertical in-
tegration being ruled out of the model. Similarly to Grossman and Helpman (2002),
outsourcing requires a search for a suitable partner. Final good producers are located
in the North while specialized suppliers are located both in the North and the South.
Parties bargain in two steps; ﬁrst, they bargain over the RSI required to customize the
input to the need of the ﬁnal good producer and second, they bargain over the price
and the quantity of the input. Customization costs depend on the technological dis-
tance2 between the two parties. Furthermore, the degree of contract incompleteness
differs across countries. In fact, the model assumes that only a fraction, different from
one country to another, of the supplier’s investment is veriﬁable by court. The model
shows that market thickness, represented by the number of suppliers, enhances out-
sourcing in a certain location. Final good producers prefer to search for partners in a
thicker market to increase the likelihood of ﬁnding a closer input supplier. By choosing
to search in a certain location, ﬁnal good producers raise the demand for suppliers’ ser-
vices and thus the suppliers proﬁt in this location as well as their willingness to enter
the market. Market thickness has, thus, a feedback effect but this effect is limited by the
wage response.
The location choice depends also on customizing technologies, search technologies and
the quality of the legal system. Customizing technologies, represented by the use of
computer-aided design for example, and search technologies, represented by the use
of information and communication technologies (ICT), have the same impact on the
2The distance between the supplier expertise and the ﬁnal good producer requirements.
9outsourcing location. A uniform improvement of these technologies will not affect the
location choice at equilibrium. Nevertheless, a disproportionate improvement in one
location will result in a shift of outsourcing toward this location. The technological
catch-up, a larger use of computers and ICTs or a larger internet coverage ratio, in cer-
tain emerging and developing countries may, hence, explain the boost of production
delocalization toward these countries.
An improvement of the legal system, or of the contracting environment has a more com-
plicated impact on the location decision. The improvement of the legal system in one
country, represented by an increase of the veriﬁable fraction of the supplier investment,
enlarges the proﬁtability of outsourcing in that location but also affects the demand
for labor and thus the wages in that location. More precisely, Grossman and Helpman
(2005) show that a similar improvement of the contracting environment in both coun-
tries will raise outsourcing in the North on the depend of the South. An improvement of
the legal system in the North, from an initial low level, will increase outsourcing in the
North. However, if this improvement occurs at an initially signiﬁcant level it may cause
a shift of outsourcing toward the South. Finally, an improvement of the legal system, in
the South, may or may not increase international outsourcing. From these models we
can deduce the following testable hypotheses:
-Larger countries, having a thicker market, will attract more outsourcing.
-A higher level of customizing technologies and search technologies in a certain country
will attract more outsourcing toward this country.
-Holding everything, especially wages, constant, a better contractual environment in a
certain location should increase outsourcing in this location.
Grossman and Helpman (2003) build on the framework elaborated by Grossman
and Helpman (2002, 2005) to analyze the choice between vertical FDI and international
outsourcing. This model considers only the ownership decision while the location de-
cision is exogenously imposed. Just as Grossman and Helpman (2002), ﬁrms face the
trade-off between governance costs, higher under FDI, and transaction costs, higher un-
10der outsourcing. The degree of contract incompleteness depends on the quality of the
legal system of the exporting country. Specialized ﬁnal good producers prefer to engage
in a relationship with the closest supplier, in term of expertise. Both ﬁnal good produc-
ers and independent suppliers have no outside option and they will split equally the
rent generated by the relationship. At equilibrium, the prevalence of one mode of orga-
nization over the other will depend on the size of the industry, the quality of the legal
system, the productivity advantage of specialized producers and the relative wage of
the exporting country.
More precisely, an increase in the size of the industry, represented by the fraction of
aggregated spending addressed to this industry, favors the prevalence of outsourcing
over vertical FDI. The increase of the demand for ﬁnal goods will increase the number
of ﬁnal good producers and thus the demand for suppliers’ services. Consequently, the
entry by independent suppliers will increase, and each ﬁnal good producer will ﬁnd
more easily a relatively close supplier.
The prevalence of outsourcing is also enhanced by the quality of the legal system as
well as by the efﬁciency advantage of specialized ﬁrms. However, it declines with the
relative wage of the southern (exporting) country. The rise of the southern relative wage
represents a fall of the world income relative to entry costs of intermediate producers
as well as an increase in the cost of product design. The implication of these effects is a
reduction of the proﬁtability of independent suppliers. The number of specialized sup-
pliers will thus fall and the distance, in expertise terms, between a ﬁnal good producer
and the closest supplier will grow.
From the Grossman and Helpman (2003) model we are able to extract the following
testable hypotheses:
-Relatively low wage countries will attract more outsourcing than FDI.
-Firms in large industries will favor outsourcing over vertical integration.
11Antras and Helpman (2004) present an interesting framework for the analysis of the
internationalization decision. They endogeneize simultaneously the organization and
location decision. In their model, ﬁnal good producers, located in the North, face four
choices of production: vertical integration, outsourcing at home, vertical FDI or interna-
tional outsourcing. Moreover, ﬁrms are heterogenous in terms of their productivity. The
production of the ﬁnal good requires two inputs, headquarter services and manufactur-
ing components. The ﬁrst input can only be produced in the North by the ﬁnal good
producer while the manufacturing component can be produced either in the North or
the South through vertical integration or outsourcing. Contracts are incomplete both in
the case of outsourcing and integration. Nevertheless, under outsourcing the ﬁnal good
producer has no outside option while under integration it has the possibility, in case
of disagreement, of ﬁring the hired manager and seizing a fraction of the production.3
This fraction differs across countries and is higher in the North. In other words, the ﬁnal
good producer has a higher bargaining power, and thus is able to appropriate a higher
fraction of the revenues, under integration than under outsourcing. Additionally his
bargaining power is higher when integration takes place in the North.
Production costs are lower in the South because of the low wages while ﬁxed costs of
organization are lower in North, the case of home sourcing, because of the geographi-
cal proximity between parties. However, ﬁxed organization costs differs across modes
of organization. Vertical integration requires large organizational costs and results in
governance inefﬁciencies. Thus, regardless of the location of the manufacturing com-
ponent production, ﬁxed organizational costs are higher under vertical integration. The
assumed hierarchy (in increasing order) of ﬁxed organizational costs is the following:
outsourcing in the North, vertical integration in the North, outsourcing in the South and
vertical FDI in the South.
At equilibrium, the internationalization strategy is determined, at the ﬁrm level, by the
productivity, at the sectoral level, by the difference in inputs’s intensity and at the coun-
3Both independent and integrated suppliers have no outside option.
12try level, by the difference in production and organizational costs. Antras and Helpman
(2004) show that in sectors intensive in manufacturing components vertical integration
is never optimal. Firms, according to their productivity, outsource domestically (in the
North) or internationally (in the South). Given that ﬁxed costs are higher under in-
ternational outsourcing, high productive ﬁrms will outsource in the South while low
productive ones will outsource in the North. The prevalence of international outsourc-
ing over domestic one is raised by the wage advantage (lower wage) of the southern
country as well as by a fall of trade costs for intermediate inputs. A higher dispersion
of ﬁrm’s productivity, representing a higher degree of heterogeneity between ﬁrms, en-
larges the fraction of ﬁrms outsourcing in the South.
In sectors intensive in headquarter services, low productive ﬁrms will source domesti-
cally while more productive one will import the manufacturing component. In each lo-
cation, more productive ﬁrms integrate while less productive ﬁrms outsource. In other
word, the most productive ﬁrms will import input through vertical FDI while the least
productive ones will outsource in the home country. Among the ﬁrms with intermedi-
ate levels of productivity, the more productive ones outsource in the South and the less
productive ones integrate in the North.
In headquarter services intensive sectors; a decline in the southern wage, or of trade
costs, favors foreign sourcing and this effect if disproportionably larger on international
outsourcing relative to vertical FDI. Moreover, when domestic sourcing falls, the de-
crease of vertical integration is disproportionably larger than that of domestic outsourc-
ing. In fact, a reduction of the southern wage will not be sufﬁcient to induce least pro-
ductive ﬁrms, outsourcing in the North, to source from the South. However, it will
induce some ﬁrms integrated in the North to switch to international outsourcing. A
higher productivity dispersion will increase foreign sourcing and favor the prevalence
of vertical FDI over international outsourcing. It will also raise the relative prevalence
of domestic integration over domestic outsourcing. This effect of productivity disper-
sion is similar to the one shown in Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004). Moreover, a
13higher headquarter services intensity favors home sourcing over international one and
favors the prevalence of integration over outsourcing.
From the Antras and Helpman (2004) model we extract the following testable hypothe-
ses:
-Vertical FDI requires higher ﬁxed organizational and search costs than international
outsourcing.
-The pattern of ﬁrms’ choice follows the pattern of organization costs; Most productive
ﬁrms engage in vertical FDI and less productive ones engage in international outsourc-
ing and the least productive ones outsource domestically.
-A higher degree of ﬁrms’ heterogeneity favors the prevalence of vertical FDI over inter-
national outsourcing.
-Intensity in headquarter services favors the prevalence of vertical FDI.
-Lower wages in the exporting country favor the prevalence of international outsourc-
ing.
3 Data Description
3.1 The Framework of the Analysis
Our analysis is based on a data set extracted from the "International Intra-group ex-
changes" ("Enquête sur les Échanges Intra-Groupe") a survey conducted by the French
ministry of economy via the SESSI (Service Des Etudes Statistiques Industrielles).
In the light of the modern developments of the economic activity and the need to ac-
count and analyze the growing internationalization of production, represented by FDI
and international trade, the French ministry of economy has realized, in 1999, the "In-
ternational Intra-group exchanges" survey in order to have a clear picture of the organi-
zation and of the structure of international trade by French ﬁrms. One of the main ob-
jectives of the survey was to analyze the strategy of French ﬁrms, and especially French
14groups, toward globalization and how this strategy is affecting the organization of their
international trade transactions.
This investigation resulted in a unique data set of 4305 individual ﬁrms located in
France controlled by 2023 international and industrial groups. This data set covers,
on average, 55% of the French imports and 61% of the French exports. Their are 218
countries toward which these ﬁrms export and 182 one from which they import. More-
over, French located afﬁliates trade mostly with other European countries as well as the
U.S.4
Given the aim of the study, the framework of the investigation has been narrowed to
groups that are industrial and international at the same time. Commercial groups have
been evicted because their trade structure does not reﬂect the impact of globalization
on the organization of the production process. A group is deﬁned as industrial if it con-
trols5 at least one industrial afﬁliate, wherever it is located. It is deﬁned as international
if it controls at least one afﬁliate located outside of France. The framework of the analy-
sis has been limited to afﬁliates for which the group has a majority control as well as to
these belonging to a joint-venture.
Each ﬁrm, present in the sample, has to provide for each of its international trade
transactions the value of the transaction, the classiﬁcation of the imported or exported
product (following the 4 digits CPA classiﬁcation) as well as the country of origin (im-
ports) or destination (exports). For each transaction, ﬁrms have also to precise the orga-
nization mode. In fact, they report the share of the transaction traded with an afﬁliated
ﬁrm located abroad, the share traded with partners and the share traded with third
parties or independent suppliers. The survey considers as partnership: technological
4For example, Germany counts for almost 20% of the imports (in terms of number of transac-
tion), Italy for more than 10%, Belgium and the U.K. for 9% each. Exports are less concentrated.
Germany counts for the highest share of French exports but this share is of 7% and Belgium,
Italy and the U.K. account for 6% each.
5Control rate at least equal to 50%.
15alliances, licensing agreements, franchise and subcontracting agreements. We are thus
able to identify three modes of organization for the offshored production: vertical in-
tegration (associated to intra-group trade), partnerships (associated to trade with part-
ners) and arm’s length transactions (associated to trade with independent suppliers).
Since each ﬁrm reports separately each of its transactions, their are several observations
perﬁrm. Morethanhalfofthetransactionareentirelyrealizedwiththirdparties, almost
30% are entirely realized within the group and only 4% of the transactions are partially
or entirely realized with partners. In this paper we focus on ﬁrms in manufacturing sec-
tors since our objective is the study of the international organization of the production
process. When we limit the sample to manufacturing afﬁliates, from which we exclude
natural resources sectors,6 we are left with 2790 afﬁliates and 230086 observations.
Figure 1 illustrates the offshoring structure in our sample. It shows, that French ﬁrms
imports their inputs mostly from Northern countries.7 It shows also that the dominant
mode of organization is outsourcing8 regardless of the location.
We have completed our data with information on the productive activity of ﬁrms.
Thisinformationisextractedfromtheﬁrmannualsurvey"EnquêteAnnuelled’Entreprise
(EAE)" realized by the French ministry of industry. It is exhaustive, obligatory and con-
cerns all ﬁrms with more than twenty employees. The "EAE" survey provides data
on the productive activity of ﬁrms such as output, sales, value-added, number of em-
ployees, stock of capital, investment and use of intermediates. This data allows us to
estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) of ﬁrms and to construct several control vari-
ables such as scale and to identify the sector of main activity. Moreover, we have con-
structed several industry and country level variables using the OECD statistical sources
and the World Bank development databases.
6Antras (2003) considers that the patterns of ownership in natural resources sectors may be
determined by factors such as national sovereignty.
7The distinction between the North and the South follows the World Bank deﬁnition of de-
veloped and developing countries.
8Outsourcing combines trade with partners and with independent suppliers.
16Figure 1: The Offshoring Structure
3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Intra-Firm Trade
The "International Intra-group exchanges" survey focuses on the determinants, motiva-
tions and evolution of intra-group trade. This allows us to present a descriptive analy-
sis of intra-group trade which is very interesting for a more complete comprehension of
vertical specialization.
Concerning the decision to trade within the group or to outsource, the results of the
survey show that, for the majority of the ﬁrms, this decision is taken at the headquarter
level and not at the ﬁrm level.
Concerning the choice of intra-group trade, the survey presents a series of 22 moti-
17Table 1: Decision of Intra-Group Trade
At which level the decision to trade within the group is taken:
At the ﬁrm level 32.79%
At a higher level within the group 52.45%
At another level within the group 4.02%
At a joint level 10.74%
vations that push the ﬁrms to prefer intra-group trade over outsourcing. The answers
of the ﬁrms go from "Perfectly agree" to "No object". In table 2, we present, for each mo-
tivation, the percentage of ﬁrms choosing a certain possibility of answer. Table 2 shows
that the control of the production process plays an important role in the choice of intra-
group trade. In fact, for 63% of the ﬁrms, the control of the quality of the production is
a motivation to supply within the group. The control of the marketing strategies and
of the after-sale service is a valid argument in favor of intra-group trade for almost 54%
of the ﬁrms. Table 2 shows also that another important matter for ﬁrms is organization;
66% of them prefer intra-group trade in order to reduce organizational costs and 60% of
the ﬁrms choose internalization in order to be supplied with more stability and at lower
costs.
Table 3 presents incentives for intra-group imports On the imports’ side, table 3
points toward international disintegration of the production process by French ﬁrms.
In fact, intra-group imports are not motivated by quality upgrading neither by capacity
adjustment. Only 16% of the imports have a higher technological level than the pro-
duction of the group in France and only 8% have a higher quality. They are essentially
destinedtocomplementtheﬁrms’productioninFrance. Formorethan80%, intra-group
imports are goods that are not produced by the group in France.
18Table 2: Intra-group Trade Motivations
Perfectly Agree Does not Does not No
agree agree agree object
at all
Lesser sensibility to conjuncture uncertainties 12.75% 36.20% 12.48% 7.62% 30.95%
Lesser sensibility to exchange rates’changes 13.04% 24.11% 14.94% 12% 35.91%
Lesser sensibility to raw materials’ prices 7.98% 23.39% 17.91% 13.54% 37.18%
Ability to plan exportation in advance 9.53% 30.05% 15.41% 8.84% 36.17%
Stability of supply 18.40% 43.36% 7.97% 4.11% 26.17%
To increase exportation 17.29% 32.04% 12.49% 5.6% 32.57%
To minimize supply’s price 20.44% 38.37% 12.60% 4.37% 24.21%
To avoid complicated contracts 16.11% 34.29% 12.05% 5.68% 31.86%
Better ﬂexibility to adjust quantities 10.56% 37.25% 19.43% 8.75% 24.01%
Better ﬂexibility to adjust prices 15.32% 44.59% 15.04% 5.53% 19.53%
To reduce organization costs 20.06% 45.98% 13.96% 4.58% 15.68%
Easier ﬁnancing 21.52% 34.79% 11.34% 5.39% 26.95%
To dissociate components production
and assembling 6.07% 16.57% 10.42% 6.40% 60.54%
Economy of scale 28.94% 35.09% 4.31% 2.4% 29.26%
To easily control the quality of products 22.59% 40.96% 11.14% 4.39% 20.92%
To avoid imitation of products 14.20% 24.90% 13.14% 6.9% 41.47%
To Maximize the proﬁtability of marketing
expenses 8.65% 23.15% 12.03% 6.88% 49.30%
To control marketing strategies 23.40% 35.46% 5.47% 3.14% 32.53%
To avoid protectionist barriers 4.88% 18.63% 13.67% 7.88% 54.96%
To access a distribution network 8.57% 23.17% 15.38% 9.98% 43.05%
To get closer to the clients 23.75% 33.67% 10.64% 5.46% 26.49%
To control the quality of after-sale services 18.37% 35.52% 9.82% 4.60% 31.69%
4 Methodology and Results
In this section we present the econometric methodology that we follow to test the hy-
potheses presented earlier. We also present and comment the empirical results. We are
interested by the offshoring strategy, thus we do not analyze domestic sourcing neither
the choice between domestic and international sourcing. We consider three modes of
offshoring; FDI, Partnerships and Outsourcing. We assume that a transaction is real-
ized under FDI if 50% or more of its value is imported from afﬁliated ﬁrms. Similarly,
19Table 3: Incentives for Intra-group Imports
The ﬁrm imports products from ﬁrms within the group because Yes NO
The group does not produce the same products in France 81.48% 18.52%
The group does not have the necessary capacity in France
to satisfy the demand 54.13% 45.83%
Those imports incorporate higher R&D and innovation
than the goods produced by the group in France 16.11% 83.89%
Those imports have higher quality than the goods produced
by the group in France 7.77% 92.23%
Those imports result from the competition between
the afﬁliates of the group 27.20% 72.80%
The ﬁrm is a logistical platform for the region 42.86% 57.14%
we assume that a transaction is organized by a Partnership (outsourcing) if 50% or more
of its value is imported from a partner (third party).
4.1 The Structure of Fixed Organization Costs
Each mode of vertical specialization requires a ﬁxed cost of organization that represents
costs of governance, monitoring, contract enforcing as well as search costs. These costs
differ between modes of organization as well as between locations. Vertical integration
requires higher governance costs while outsourcing requires search costs. Domestic
sourcing, regardless of the mode of organization, is assumed to necessitate lower or-
ganization costs than foreign sourcing. The hierarchy of ﬁxed costs is very important
because it determines the pattern of vertical specialization according to ﬁrm’s produc-
tivity. We associate ﬁxed costs with ﬁrm’s ﬁxed assets and in order to determine the
structure of organization costs we have compared ﬁrm’s ﬁxed assets according to their
offshoring strategy.
Table 4 shows that, contrary to Antras and Helpman (2004) assumption, FDI requires
20Table 4: The Structure of Organization Costs




the smallest amount of ﬁxed organizational costs while Partnership requires the highest
amount. The differences between the ﬁxed costs associated to each mode of offshoring
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.9 This result conﬁrms the ﬁgure in table 2
where 66% of the ﬁrms link the choice of intra-group trade to the reduction of organi-
zation costs. Partnerships necessitate higher ﬁxed cost than arm’s length transactions.
While both modes of organization requires search costs for a suitable partner we can
assume that costs of governance and monitoring are higher in the case of Partnerships.
4.2 The Choice of Offshoring Strategies: A Multinomial Logit Esti-
mation
We have analyzed the choice of offshoring strategies by estimating a multinomial logit
model. Each ﬁrm faces three different choices to organize its international trade trans-
actions. A multinomial logit model allows the simultaneous estimation of these three
choices. More precisely the speciﬁcation of the multinomial logit model is as follows:







jxi j = 0;1;:::j
Pij is the probability that the dependant variable, the choice of an offshoring start-
egy, takes the value j at the ith observation. As mentioned earlier, j can be vertical
9The statistical difference is based on a mean difference test.
21integration(j = 1), Partnership (j = 2) or Outsourcing (j = 3). xi is the vector of ex-
planatory variables (the same as in the Probit estimation) at the ﬁrm, the sector and the
country level.
However, the model is unidentiﬁed in the sense that there are more than one solution
to 1, 2 and 3 that lead to the same probabilities for Y1,...Y3. The identiﬁcation of
the model imposes that one of the choices is deﬁned as a base group and its  set to
zero.Thus the remaining coefﬁcients would measure the relative change with respect to







by a change in the explanatory variables, in the probability of a choice with respect to
the base group. This means that the choice j (FDI, Partnership) will be more or less
likely relative to the base group (Outsourcing). Secondly, we set FDI as our base group
in order to have the relative likelihood of Partnerships compared to FDI depending on
the independent variables.
We have associated the choice of each mode of offshoring to a set of variables reﬂecting
ﬁrm heterogeneity, industry and country characteristics:
 Total factor productivity (TFP); this variable represents ﬁrm heterogeneity. We
estimate TFP using the semiparametric estimation proposed by Olley and Pakes
(Olley and Pakes, 1996).10 We expect the pattern of ﬁrms’ productivity to follow
the structure of organizational costs. However, we assume that the productivity
may be affected by the offshoring strategy, thus as robustness check we use a two
years lag of TFP as explanatory variable
 Scale: This variable is another measure of ﬁrm heterogeneity. We measure scale
10We estimate TFP separately for each sector using the entire "EAE" data set. The purpose
of the O&P methodology is to overcome the selection and simultaneity problems faced by the
econometrician when estimating productivity.
22by the number of employees. Larger ﬁrm have the possibility to spread the ﬁxed
costs of organization on a larger scale and thus maintain a competitive average
cost of production.
 Headquarter Services Intensity: We associate headquarter services with the R&D
activity. This variable is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total pro-
duction at the two digit industry level.11 In this variable, the sectoral classiﬁcation
is related to the main activity of the importing ﬁrms. R&D expenditures at the sec-
toral level are taken from the OECD Science and Technology Statistics database12
and total production is calculated using the "EAE" data set.
We expect R&D intensity at the Firm’s level to increase the prevalence of interna-
tional vertical integration.
 Input Speciﬁcity: We associate input speciﬁcity with R&D intensity. Input speci-
ﬁcity represents the RSI required for the production of the input and indicates the
extent of transaction costs associated with the transaction. This variable is mea-
sured similarly to the headquarter services intensity however it is calculated at the
level of the imported input’s industry.
A higher input speciﬁcity increases transaction costs as well as the severity of
hold-up problems. We thus expect R&D intensity at the input’s level to favor
FDI.
 Capital intensity: this variable is measured as the ratio of capital (ﬁxed asset)
stocks to total employment at the three digit sectoral level. Capital stocks and
total employment are calculated using the "EAE" data set. We deﬁne two capi-
tal intensity variables, one at the imported input’s industry level and one at the
ﬁrm’s industry level. Capital intensity at the ﬁrm level may be interpreted as an-
other measure of Headquarter services intensity.
11We also measured R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D expenditures to value added but the
results are very similar across these two measures.
12R&D expenditure are only available at the two digit industry classiﬁcation.
23We expect capital intensity at the Firm’s industry level to increase FDI, and fol-
lowing Antras (2003) we expect capital intensity at the input’s industry level to
favor FDI as well.
 Capital Endowment: this variable is measured at level of the exporting country
and corresponds to the ratio of capital stock to the labor force. We have obtained
data on the labor force and ﬁxed capital formation from the World Bank data
base. We construct measures of capital stock following the perpetually inventory
method using data on ﬁxed capital formation from 1960. We have assumed an
annual depreciation rate of 15%. To approximate the value of the capital stock at
the beginning of the time series we have assumed a 5% pre-sample growth rate of
the capital stock.
Following Antras (2003) we expect capital endowment to favor FDI.
 Market Thickness: We measure market thickness by the employment level in man-
ufacturing industries in each country. We construct the market thickness variable
using data on employment from the World Bank data base.
Market Thickness represents the easiness to ﬁnd a suitable supplier, we thus ex-
pect this variable to have a positif impact on Partnerships and Outsourcing.
 ICT: this variable corresponds to the per capita expenditures on information and
communication technologies at the exporting country level. It is obtained from
the World Bank data base and represents the state of search technologies in the
exporting country.
A good level of search technologies reduces search costs, we thus expect this vari-
able to favor Partnerships and Outsourcing.
 Internet Diffusion: This variable corresponds to the number of internet users per
1000 people in the exporting country. It is obtained from the World Bank data
base. It is another measure of search technologies, we expect it to have a similar
effect as the ICT variable.
24 Industry Size: This variable represents the relative signiﬁcance of the ﬁrm’s in-
dustry. According to Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003) the size of the ﬁrm’s in-
dustry may have two opposite effects on the organization choice. A larger down-
stream industry increases the demand for suppliers’s services and thus induces
the entry by specialized supplier and creates a thicker upstream market. How-
ever, a larger downstream industry means a larger number of ﬁnal good produc-
ers searching for suitable suppliers which makes it harder and more costly for
each one of them. In the theoretical framework, with two countries, the size of the
downstream industry is measured at the level of the importing country. In the real
world, it is more concrete to assume that demand for suppliers’ services depends
on the global size of the downstream industry and not only on its size in France.
We construct the measure of the industry size using the "Trade and Production"
data base of the CEPII.13 This data set presents, for each manufacturing industry
following the 2-digits ISIC classiﬁcation, the total output in each of the 183 coun-
tries it covers. We aggregate the output of each industry over all the countries, we
have also aggregated the output over all industries and countries to create a mea-
sure of world total manufacturing production. We then construct our measure of
industry size as the share of the worldwide industry output in the total worldwide
manufacturing output.
 Wage: this variable corresponds to the average industrial wage in each exporting
country. Data on wages are from the Rama and Artecona (2002) database. Wages
represent production costs in the exporting country. Lower wages, in a certain
location, favor international sourcing from this location. Antras and Helpman
(2004) show that lower wages increase the prevalence of international outsourcing
over vertical FDI. However, given the structure of ﬁxed costs, we expect lower
wages to favor the relative prevalence of FDI.
 Rule of Law: this variable represents the quality of the legal system in the export-
13A detailed presentation of this data base is available in Mayer and Zignago (2005).
25ing country. It corresponds to the "Rule of Law" variable from the Kaufmann et al.
(2003) governance database for the year 1999. A better legal system reduces the
transaction costs related to contract enforcement and reduces risks related to the
hold-up problem.
We expect a better legal system to favor Partnerships and Outsourcing compared
to FDI.
 GDP per capita: this variable is from the World Bank database and is added as a
control variable.
 Distance: this is also a control variable which represents the distance between
France and the exporting country. For each ﬁrm, we have its location at the re-
gional level.14 We have thus calculated the distance as the great circle distance
between the main city of the exporting country and the main city of the ﬁrm’s
region. The countries’ geographical coordinates are from the CEPII’s "Trade and
Production" database15 and those of the French regions ("departement") are from
Crozet et al. (2004).
Results of the multinomial logit estimation are presented in table 5.The ﬁrst (fourth)
column compares FDI to Outsourcing, the second (ﬁfth) column compares Partnership
to Outsourcing while the third (sixth) column compares Partnership to FDI.
The multinomial logit estimation shows clearly that the pattern of ﬁrm heterogene-
ity follows the structure of ﬁxed costs. Productivity and scale reduce the probability
of vertical integration relatively to outsourcing, moreover they enhance the probability
of establishing partnerships in comparison to outsourcing and FDI. The pattern of ﬁrm
14The regional level corresponds to the Nuts 3 classiﬁcation. Each region corresponds to a
French "departement".
15We have chosen New York as the main city the US, Toronto for Canada and Frankfurt for
Germany.
26heterogeneity is conﬁrmed in the third and sixth columns which show that measures
of ﬁrm heterogeneity (TFP and scale) favor the choice of partnership in comparison to
FDI. To summarize, table 5 shows that more productive ﬁrms and larger ones offshore
their production through partnerships, ﬁrms with intermediate levels of productivity
and scale establish arm’s length transaction with independent suppliers and relatively
small and low productive ﬁrms offshore through from vertical integration.
The second point we consider is related to the intensity in headquarter services and
to input speciﬁcity. The transaction costs theory predicts that when input speciﬁcity
is signiﬁcant transaction costs related to outsourcing are high and vertical integration
is more efﬁcient to organize production. The property rights theory put forward that
when the transaction is intensive in the ﬁnal good producer’s speciﬁc investment ver-
tical integration is optimal. Our results conﬁrm both these hypotheses. Both our mea-
sures of headquarter services intensity and input speciﬁcity favor FDI in comparison to
outsourcing as well as partnerships. Interestingly, both measures increase the relative
probability of outsourcing compared to that of partnerships. This result means that, in
headquarter intensive industries, when ﬁrms do not integrate they do not establish long
term and contractually complex relationships. They prefer to source from independent
suppliers probably awaiting for the establishment of an afﬁliate in the exporting coun-
try.
Moreover, the capital intensity at the ﬁrm level, which we have considered as an an-
other measure of headquarter services, have the similar effect as the headquarter ser-
vices variable. It increases the relative probability of vertical integration in comparison
to outsourcing as well as partnerships and it favor outsourcing relatively to partner-
ships.
Regarding the assumptions of the Antras (2003) model related to the capital intensity
of imported inputs and the relative abundance in capital of the exporting country, our
27results contradicts these hypotheses. More precisely, table 5 shows that capital intensive
inputs are traded through arm’s length transaction, especially with independent suppli-
ers. The variable representing capital intensity at the input level reduces the probability
of vertical integration relative to that of outsourcing and partnerships. Moreover, the
relative capital abundance of the exporting countries also reduces the relative probabil-
ity of vertical FDI. The results of the Antras (2003) models depends on the transferability
of investment decision assumption. Antras (2003) analyzes the case where the bargain-
ing power of the supplier is weak and where the ﬁnal good producer bears the totality
of the investment costs of its supplier. Jabbour (2006) provides an empirical analysis of
the transferability of investment decision assumption based on data from French manu-
facturing industries and shows that this assumption is valid only in industries sensitive
to input speciﬁcity, especially the ones intensive in R&D expenditures. When input
speciﬁcity is not signiﬁcant the hold-up problem does not occur because the supplier
can always sell the input to a third party and, thus, will always realize an optimal level
of investment. Capital intensive inputs are not necessary speciﬁc assets, for this reason
ﬁnal good producers do not need to engage in investment cost-sharing with their sup-
pliers in these industries and thus vertical integration is not optimal for the offshoring
of these inputs.
Another signiﬁcant element of the organizational choice of offshored production is
the market thickness in the exporting country. Market thickness will determine the
search effort required by each ﬁnal good producer to ﬁnd a suitable partner. When
the search costs are very high, vertical integration is optimal. Our results conﬁrm this
assumption. In countries with thicker markets, ﬁrms prefer the establishment of con-
tractual relationships. The market thickness variable reduces the relative probability of
vertical FDI in comparison to outsourcing as well as partnerships. However, the mar-
ket thickness variable has no signiﬁcant impact on the choice between outsourcing and
partnerships, since both mode of organization require the search for a suitable partner.
28The quality of the search technologies also affect the choice of offshoring modes simi-
larly to the market thickness. A higher level of search technologies reduces the search
costs and decreases the necessity of vertical integration. We have represented the search
technologiesbytwocountryspeciﬁcvariables, theinternetdiffusionandtheinvestment
in ICTs. Interestingly, these two variables have not the exact same effect. The internet
diffusion variable favor the relative probability of outsourcing in comparison to vertical
FDI as well as partnerships while having no signiﬁcant effect on the choice between
FDI and partnerships. The ICT variable increases the probability of Partnerships rela-
tively to that of FDI and of outsourcing while having no signiﬁcant impact on the choice
between FDI and outsourcing. The internet diffusion variable represents a basic level
of information technologies while the investment in ICTs represents the effort made to
upgrade and improve the available information and communication technologies. The
fact that investment in ICTs favor partnerships suggest that this mode of offshoring
gives place to an exchange of information and technology as well as monitoring and
control. Relationships between parent companies and their afﬁliates also give place to
ﬂows of information and technology, however these ﬂows are easier to channel between
integrated ﬁrms and depend, to a lesser extent, on the technological state of the host
country. Arm’s length relationships with independent suppliers do not seem to engage
the ﬁrms in information and technology transfer. Moreover, if outsourcing corresponds
to relatively short term relationships (in comparison to partnership) it requires recur-
rent search and matching process which my explain its sensitivity to the basic levels of
search technologies.
The size of the downstream industry favors long term relationships, vertical integration
and partnership, relatively to outsourcing. Nevertheless, it enhances the probability of
partnerships in comparison to FDI. This result may be explained by the double effect
of the size of the downstream industry on search costs. A large number of ﬁnal good
producers increases the entry by specialized suppliers as well as the competition for
their services. Each ﬁnal good producer, in a large industry, prefer to establish a long
29term relationship to avoid recurrent high search costs, on the other hand the entry by
specialized suppliers enhances the attractiveness of partnerships compared to vertical
integration.
The quality of the legal system matters only in the case of partnerships. As expected,
it favors partnership relatively to vertical integration. However, the fact that the qual-
ity of legal system favors partnership over outsourcing and does not affect the choice
between FDI and outsourcing suggests that partnerships are associated with more com-
plex contractual agreements than outsourcing. Note that the quality of the legal system
has two opposite effects on the choice of FDI. One one hand, a better legal system means
a lower level of contract incompleteness and thus reduces the probability of FDI. On the
other hand, the quality of the legal system is an indicator of the quality of the institu-
tions and of the governance in the exporting country, in this sense a higher level of the
legal quality will increase the attractiveness of the country for FDI inﬂows.
According to our expectation and given the structure of ﬁxed costs and the pattern of
ﬁrm heterogeneity, the wage level in the exporting country has a negative effect on the
relative probability of vertical FDI. This results means that when foreign production
costs decrease, a larger share of domestic ﬁrms are able to incur the offshoring costs and
to switch from domestic sourcing to foreign sourcing. Since these ﬁrms are less produc-
tive than the ones engaged in offshoring, they will switch to the least expensive mode
of organization, vertical FDI.
4.3 The Relative Prevalence of Offshoring Modes
In this section we investigate the relative prevalence of the offshoring modes. Our main
interest is the impact of the extent of ﬁrm heterogeneity on the relative prevalence of
the the different modes of organization. Helpman et al. (2004) associate the degree
of heterogeneity with the dispersion of ﬁrm’s productivity. We calculate productivity
30Table 5: The Choice of Offshoring Strategies: A Multinomial Logit Estimation
Base Group: Outsourcing Base Group:FDI Base Group: Outsourcing Base Group:FDI
(FDI) (Partnership) (Partnership) (FDI) (Partnership) (Partnership)
TFP –0.257 1.30 1.56
(0.043) (0.113) (0.118)
TFP (Lagged) –0.08 1.29 1.37
(0.044) (0.12) (0.124)
Firm Scale –0.067 0.564 0.632 –0.055 0.58 0.636
(0.007) (0.017) (0.018) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018)
GDP per capita 0.859 –0.943 –1.8 0.858 –1.059 –1.91
(0.11) (0.21) (0.22) (0.11) (0.214) (0.023)
Market Thickness –0.127 –0.034 0.093 –0.13 –0.014 0.116
(0.009) (0.022) (0.023) (0.009) (0.023) (0.024)
Wage –0.183 –0.335 –0.152 –0.21 –0.369 -0.161
(0.035) (0.067) (0.072) (0.036) (0.069) (0.75)
Rule of Law –0.028 0.373 0.4 0.32 0.382 0.35
(0.099) (0.196) (0.21) (0.103) (0.202) (0.216)
Distance 0.127 0.241 0.114 0.125 0.254 0.128
(0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.012) (0.029) (0.03)
ICT 0.013 0.492 0.478 –0.36 0.449 0.485
(0.057) (0.11) (0.115) (0.059) (0.11) (0.119)
Internet Diffusion –0.086 –0.125 –0.039 –0.072 –0.139 -0.067
(0.029) (0.061) (0.065) (0.029) (0.064) (0.068)
Headquarter Intensity 0.176 –0.155 –0.331 0.166 –0.176 –0.34
(0.009) (0.023) (0.025) (0.009) (0.024) (0.025)
Input Speciﬁcity 0.148 –0.008 –0.156 0.143 –0.026 –0.169
(0.009) (0.022) (0.023) (0.009) (0.023) (0.24)
Capital Endowment –0.599 0.585 1.184 –0.549 0.824 1.37
(0.064) (0.13) (0.138) (0.065) (0.133) (0.142)
Capital Intensity –0.196 –0.047 0.149 –0.217 –0.096 0.121
(Product level) (0.015) (0.039) (0.041) (0.016) (0.041) (0.043)
Capital Intensity 0.065 –0.303 –0.368 0.077 –0.26 -0.338
(Firm level) (0.017) (0.044) (0.046) (0.017) (0.047) (0.049)
Industry Size 0.133 0.653 0.52 0.147 0.59 0.446
(0.014) (0.037) (0.039) (0.014) (0.039) (0.040)
No. of obs 67182 67182 67182 62815 62815 62815
Log Likelihood -41173.71 -41173.71 -41173.71 -38882.88 -38882.88 -38882.88
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.046
All independent variable are in natural logarithm. ,  and  represent respectively statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
dispersion as the standard deviation of the productivity distribution in each industry,
following the 4 digits French classiﬁcation. We obtain the standard deviation of the pro-
31ductivity distribution from the "EAE" data set.
According to the theory, Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Antras and Helpman
(2004), the extent of ﬁrms heterogeneity should enlarge the prevalence of the mode of
offshoring adopted by high productive ﬁrms and reduce the prevalence of the one cho-
sen by the least productive ﬁrms. In the light of our earlier results we expect the produc-
tivity dispersion to enhance the prevalence of partnership and to reduce the prevalence
of FDI.
We aggregate the transactions’ value by country and industry. The industry corre-
sponds to the main activity of the ﬁnal good producer, the French importing ﬁrm, and
follows the 4 digits French classiﬁcation. We deﬁne the relative prevalence as the ra-
tio of one mode of organization over the other. Since our main interest in on the effect
of the extent of ﬁrm heterogeneity, we focus on the relative prevalence in accordance
with the pattern of ﬁrms’s productivity. In other words, we have focused on the relative
prevalence of outsourcing over FDI and that of partnerships over outsourcing.
In addition to the productivity dispersion, we add country and industry characteris-
tics, such as capital endowment at the country level, headquarter services intensity and
capital intensity at the industry level. Following Yeaple (2006), we also add the average
ﬁrm size as well as the ratio of value-added to sales in each 4 digits industry to the set of
explanatory variables. One of the problems of this analysis is the presence of zeros, the
absence of a certain mode of organization in a pair of country-industry. To minimize the
creation of missing values, we choose, as a denominator of the ratios, the most frequent
mode of organization, outsourcing. Moreover, instead of estimating a linear regression
by taking the logarithm of the dependent variable, and thus eliminating the zeros, we
estimate our speciﬁcation using a Poisson regression (Silva and Tenreyro, 2003; Yeaple,
2006).
Table 6 presents the result of the Poisson estimation. In the ﬁrst and third columns
the dependent variable is the ratio of FDI over outsourcing in each pair of country and








Productivity Dispersion –0.196 7.575
(0.053) (0.107)
Productivity Dispersion(Lagged) –1.420 8.73
(0.050) (0.138)
Headquarter Intensity 0.402 –0.222 0.417 –0.117
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012)
Capital Endowment –0.270 –0.61 –0.271 –0.633
(0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Capital Intensity –0.128 –1.18 –0.049 -1.79
(0.012) (0.042) (0.012) (0.046)
Value Added Ratio 0.029 6.85 –0.492 7.447
(0.024) (0.112) (0.027) ( 0.105)
Mean Scale 0.768 0.925 0.853 1.15
(0.007) (0.02) (0.007) (0.02)
No. of obs 4081 4081 3871 3871
Log Likelihood -110984.65 -15475.16 -109301.58 -14181.62
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.31 0.118 0.32
All independent variable, except for the Productivity dispersion, are in natural logarithm. ,
 and  represent respectively statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
industry while the dependent variable in the second and fourth section is the ratio of
partnershipoveroutsourcing. Table6shows, asexpected, thatthedispersionofproduc-
tivity enlarges the prevalence of partnership and reduces that of FDI. The other results
corroborate our previous ﬁndings. Headquarter services intensity and capital intensity
(at the ﬁrm level) favor the prevalence of FDI over outsourcing and that of outsourcing
over partnerships. Further capital endowment at the country level boosts the relative
prevalence of outsourcing.
335 Conclusion
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the offshoring strategy by French man-
ufacturing ﬁrms. Offshoring corresponds to the delocalization of certain steps of the
production process to a foreign country. This delocalization can take place within the
boundaries of the ﬁrm, through FDI, or at arm’s length, with independent suppliers.
Offshoring can also be organized by certain "Hybrid" forms of organization such as the
establishment of long term partnerships.
Thegrowingsigniﬁcanceofoffshoringininternationaltradeﬂows(Feenstra,1998;Campa
and Goldberg, 1997) has pushed the emergence of a theoretical literature analyzing the
internationalization strategy at the ﬁrm level. This theoretical literature combines ele-
ments of the international trade literature with elements from the ﬁrm’s theory in the
purpose of drawing a framework allowing the endogenization of the internationaliza-
tion strategy (location and organization) at equilibrium. In this paper, we focus on the-
oretical models based on the property rights and transaction costs theories of the ﬁrm
(Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986), more precisely the Grossman and Help-
man (2002, 2003, 2005), Antras (2003) and the Antras and Helpman (2004) models. On
the basis of the conclusions of these models, we deﬁne a certain number of testable hy-
potheses and we empirically investigate their validity.
We study the offshoring strategy by applying a multinomial logit model as well a
Poisson estimation of the relative prevalence of the organization modes. We mainly
focus on ﬁrm heterogeneity as a determinant of the offshoring strategy. We also empha-
size the role of country characteristics, such as the wage, capital endowment and market
thickness, the role of industry characteristics such as the size, intensity in capital or in
headquarter services, and the role of input speciﬁcities. Our results partially conﬁrm
the conclusion of the Antras and Helpman (2004) model regarding ﬁrm heterogeneity.
In fact, we ﬁnd that the pattern of ﬁrm heterogeneity, represented by the productivity
and scale, follows the structure of organizational ﬁxed costs. However, and to the con-
34trary to the Antras and Helpman (2004) assumptions, our data show that contractual
relationships requires higher organizational costs than vertical integration and that or-
ganizational costs are higher under partnerships in comparison to outsourcing.
The results from the Probit and Multinomial logit estimations show that most produc-
tive and large ﬁrms engage in partnerships, low productive and low scale ones verti-
cally integrate while ﬁrms with intermediate levels of productivity and scale outsource
from independent suppliers. Moreover, the within sector heterogeneity, represented by
the dispersion of the productivity distribution, enhances the prevalence of partnerships
and reduces that of vertical integration.
Our estimations validate another assumption of the Antras and Helpman (2004)
model, the one related to the intensity in headquarter services. In accordance with the
property rights theory, Antras and Helpman (2004) show that the intensity in headquar-
terservicesraisestheprevalenceofverticalintegration. Wehaveassociatedheadquarter
services to the R&D and capital intensities at the level of the ﬁrm’s industry. Our results
show that headquarter services’ intensity increases the probability of organizing inter-
national trade through FDI as well as the relative prevalence of FDI.
However we provide results contradicting the conclusion of the Antras (2003) model
concerning the effect of the exporting country’s capital abundance and input’s capital
intensity on the structure of international trade. We ﬁnd that capital intensive inputs
are imported under contractual form of organization and that the relative capital abun-
dance, at the exporting country level, increases the probability and the prevalence of
contractual agreements and reduces that of vertical integration.
Regarding the impact of market thickness, our results conﬁrm the assumption by
Grossman and Helpman (2002). The thickness of the market represents the availability
of specialized suppliers and the extent of search costs required for a specialized ﬁnal
good producer to ﬁnd a suitable supplier. In thicker markets search costs are reduced
35and ﬁrms prefer contractual agreements. Our variables of market thickness and search
costs favor the probability of adopting contractual agreements. Moreover, ﬁnal good
producers in large industries prefer partnerships over outsourcing in order to avoid re-
current competition for suppliers’ services.
Given the scarcity of the empirical evidence on internationalization and vertical spe-
cialization, this paper offers a signiﬁcant contribution to the growing literature on this
subject. The empirical analysis is based on a large set of ﬁrms and allows the clear
deﬁnition of organizational modes and to control for determining elements at the ﬁrm,
industry and country levels. The main contribution is to present empirical answers to
the assumptions presented by the theoretical literature. As mentioned earlier, in this
paper we focus on theoretical models based on the property rights theory of the ﬁrm,
yet the literature on internationalization includes also theoretical contributions based
on alternative theories of the ﬁrm. A natural extension of this work will be to present
empirical investigation of these alternative theories and to confront their validity in the
explanation of the internationalization strategy.
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